



## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Korean Situation of the State of th

## I. Military Situation. The way of the state of the state of the

latest official reporte (as of 2200, 26 June, Washington time) indicate that the capture of Seoul is imminent and that no concerted attempt is being made by couthern forces to withdraw for continued resistance couth of the capital. All southern troops have been committed to the defense of Seoul and at least one of the four divisions in the Seoul area has been demoralized and cut-up. Southern forces in the Seoul area has been demoralized and cut-up. Southern forces have held in areas east of Seoul and along the east coast, but critical ammunition shortages are developing and a reported landing 35 miles northeast of Pusan threatens to cut over-land supply route from Pusan to the north and east.

Northern forces still have adequate reserves and are capable of launching further large-scale offensives all along the line from Seoul to the east coast. Southern Korean units, their morals deteriorating, are incapable of resisting the determined artiller tankair assaults with the equipment now available. Unless couthern army believes etrong US assistance is imminent, their organized resistance will collapse completely with the fall of Seoul. Latest press reports are more optimistic. For example, the southern Korean Minister in Tokyo has announced that couthern forces have launched an offensive north of Seoul. Although these reports attest to the confusion prevailing in the area, CIA does not believe the southern forces are capable of mounting a sustained offensive at this time.

## .II. Survival Potential.

The President and Cabinet of the Republic of Korea are reported in official US traffic to have left Seoul, probably for Chinhae in souther eastern Korea. In view of the brief time available for evacuation it is doubtful if sufficient numbers of government operating personnel have left Seoul to make the government effective at a new location. The Premier, reportedly despairing of "saving anything," has handed over full enthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff. The latter appears equally hopeauthority to the Army Chief of Staff.

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in the face of the enemy's exclusive possession of tanks and preponderance of fighter aircraft. The fall of Seoul appears to be immediately imminent. The chances of organized resistance being maintained after Seoul's fall are, at best, minimal, in view of the Chief of Staff's opinion that when Seoul falls resistance is useless, the exhaustion of many types of amumition employed by ROK forces, and the commitment of all southern forces to the defense of Seoul. It is problematical whother cohesive southern Korean resistance will continue beyond the next 24 hours.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central
Intelligence

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